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Posthumanist education 
 
Abstract: 
This contribution distinguishes between different varieties of posthumanism. It promotes a ‘critical 
posthumanism’ which engages with an emerging new world picture at the level of ethics, ecology, 
politics, technology and epistemology. On this basis, the contribution explores the question of a 
posthumanist and postanthropocentric education both from a philosophical, theoretical and 
practical, curricular point of view. It concludes by highlighting some of the implications that a 
posthumanist education might have. 
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1. The posthumanisation of the education system 
One might be very tempted to dismiss the subject posthumanism merely as another Anglo-American 
theory fashion and to simply wait for this latest ‘postism’ to go the way of all previous ones. If there 
was no globalization with its tangible effects both at an economic as well as media and cultural level, 
this might indeed be possible or even a sensible thing to do. But the fact is that, even in disciplines 
that have always been predominantly focused on their respective national cultures such as the 
humanities and social sciences – and this includes education of course – global ‘flows’ now 
increasingly provide the main political and institutional impulses. This occurs through global 
competition and mechanisms of international ‘transparency’ (cf. university league tables, or the 
European PISA studies), which connect comparative educational standards with business location 
and correlate local training standards with an increasingly globally competitive and mobile 
workforce. This puts national education systems under pressure to open themselves up to 
international and global benchmarking. Education, as a still predominantly national institution is 
forced, due to ‘flexible’ tax legislation under the conditions of global neoliberalism, is forced to make 
major investments to convince mobile international and global corporations that the right political 
decisions are being taken to provide attractive business locations including a flexible and skilled 
workforce ready for the ‘knowledge society’. 
International comparison is thus regularly used to break up ‘rigid’ or ‘obsolete’ local structures within 
educational systems and to create greater ‘transparency’, ‘flexibility’ and ‘competitiveness’. The aim 
is to prevent or maybe reverse the culturally and financially disastrous losses to educational 
investment through ‘brain drain’. It would not be difficult to show that in the context of the global 
flow of ideas in recent decades, Europe and most of its nation states have been suffering from a 
strong educational ‘trade deficit’. The pressure on education systems under these conditions of 
competition and free market ideology through mechanisms like for example ‘transferable skills’ 
aimed at streamlining and adjusting national workforces with regard to global employability and 
mobility, in my view, already constitutes a context which might one might call ‘posthumanist’. The 
posthumanist school and university in this rather reductive economistic sense, together with the 
accelerating and intensifying reliance on (new) media technologies, therefore, in a sense, already 
presupposes the reality of an ongoing process that might be called ‘posthumanization’. 
Already in 1996, Bill Readings’s The University in Ruins provided a critique of the neoliberalization of 
the university. Readings’s debunking of the vacuity of neoliberal ideologemes like ‘excellence’, 
however, was not enough to prevent the further managerialization and the global reach of the 
‘corporate university’. In fact, similar trends have been spreading throughout the entire education 
system since, so that the fundamental link between humanism and education, for better or for 
worse, has become more tentative. If universities all over the world are anxious to invest ever more 
money in marketing to improve their ranking and to attract lucrative international students, as well 
as in satellite institutions and distance learning environments, this is happening due to a repackaging 
of (humanist) education as ‘knowledge transfer’ with a view to the advent of ‘information society’. At 
the same time, mobility, transparency, flexibility and multiliteracy are used to sell an entirely 
instrumentalized form of education as individual investment and as ‘lifelong learning’. This means 
that the previous humanist consensus that education most importantly serves to help develop 
‘personality’ has been entirely discredited. 
 
This is the historical context in which the phrase ‘posthumanist education’, in my view, has to placed. 
In my Posthumanism: A Critical Analysis (2013; German edition 2009), I introduced some 
differentiations which I believe are still helpful to understand the emergence and the development of 
the discourse of ‘posthumanism’. First, there is the distinction between ‘posthuman’ and 
‘posthumanist’, in which posthuman refers to a more or less fictitious ‘figure’, usually represented as 
either a specter, a desirable ideal or simply human destiny (cf. also Braidotti 2013); while 
posthumanist, instead, refers to something like a current task, namely a questioning or an ongoing 
deconstruction of the entire intellectual tradition and the sets of values that humanism is based on 
(cf. Badmington 2000). Posthumanism, in sum, therefore works like a discourse, with its own 
posthuman objects and its construction of a new social reality. Within this discourse, I would 
however attempt to further differentiate between some positions with regard to changing social 
reality (i.e. posthumanisms): namely a popular posthumanism and a critical posthumanism, on the 
one hand, and a posthumanism ‘with’ and ‘without’ technology, on the other hand. Popular 
posthumanism is based on the idea of present or future transformation of humans into ‘posthumans’ 
and can be seen at work in popular science magazines, television debates, Youtube videos and 
ubiquitous science fiction scenarios (all of these are increasingly merging into a new cultural 
imaginary). Critical posthumanism, as a result, means above all a questioning of the current ambient 
ideas and trends with regard to the process of ‘posthumanization’, its motivations and ideological 
presuppositions. Critical posthumanism therefore provides a kind of ‘psychoanalytic’ reading of 
current desires and fears of human transformation and self-understanding. It understands the prefix 
‘post’ as a symptom of a partially repressed lack of meaning at the core of the human (cf. 
Herbrechter & Callus 2008). The commonsensical understanding of posthumanism focuses on 
technological change. This posthumanism ‘with’ technology usually constitutes an approach based 
on the idea of an autonomy or autopoiesis of technological development, while a posthumanism 
‘without’ technology is of course not literally luddite, but intends to divert the emphasis of the 
discussion away from technocentrism and technological determinism towards a more general 
(post)anthropological trajectory (cf. Herbrechter & Callus 2007). 
Another clarification with regard to critical posthumanism concerns the historical dynamic of things 
posthuman. Criticial posthumanism problematizes the prefix ‘post’ – in analogy with Lyotard’s notion 
of the ‘post’ in ‘postmodern’ – in the sense that it problematizes the very possibility of ‘overcoming’ 
or ‘transcending’ a humanist world picture. In this sense, posthumanism is clearly distinguished from 
transhumanism. As the prefix ‘trans’ indicates, transhumanists like Hans Moravec, Vernon Vinge, or 
Nick Bostrom argue for such a transcendence – a kind of transfer of humans into something else (i.e. 
into a new species, superhumans, artificial intelligence etc.). Popular posthumanism often plays with 
such transhumanist scenarios. In its critical variety, however, posthumanism places the emphasis on 
a re-evaluation of humanist tradition and refers back to ‘proto-posthumanist’ approaches which 
already exist in various humanist traditions and antihumanist stances. It is therefore necessary to be 
aware of existing posthumanizing tendencies within humanism itself (and its critique) in order to 
keep a critical handle on the actual potential of and resistance to the excesses of current 
posthumanization scenarios. 
2. Posthumanism and pedagogy 
The academic debate about posthumanism in fact has had an important educational component 
from the start even though it might have remained somewhat in the background until more recently. 
The first academic use of the term, in 1977, by the American literary and cultural theorist Ihab 
Hassan, occurred in the context and the genre of what he called a “university masque”. Hassan 
alludes to the following consequences with regard to a nascent posthumanism in the university: 
There is nothing supernatural in the process leading us to a posthumanist culture. That process 
depends mainly on the growing intrusion of the human mind into nature and history, on the 
dematerialization of life and the conceptualization of existence. (Hassan 1977: 835) 
And he continues: 
At present, posthumanism may appear variously as a dubious neologism, the latest slogan, or 
simply another image of man's recurrent self-hate. Yet posthumanism may also hint at a 
potential in our culture, hint at a tendency struggling to become more than a trend... We need 
... to understand that the human form – including human desire and all its external 
representations – may be changing radically, and thus must be re-visioned. We need to 
understand that five hundred years of humanism may be coming to end, as humanism 
transforms itself into something that we must helplessly call posthumanism. (843) 
The essential link between education and humanism lies in education’s historical aim of preparing 
children for majority (Mündigkeit; cf. Adorno 1971). And it is by no means a surprise that there are 
many current attempts to defend humanist objectives within education especially in the face of 
humanism’s demise (see for example, Nussbaum 1997, Nida-Rümelin 2013). However, what seems to 
be irreversibly broken is the previous social and cultural consensus about humanist ideals and values 
– even though it now looks highly questionable that these ever were as ‘universalist’ or 
‘universalisable’ as they were made out to be. Humanism’s ambition to be universal in reach, based 
on the essentialist claim towards a common human ‘nature’, was in fact always underwritten by a 
very specific ‘norm’ (namely white, male, European, cosmopolitan, enlightened, rational, etc.). It is 
precisely this universalist normativity that has become untenable, or simply has lost its implied 
addressee and appeal, in the age of global migration, multiculturalism and radical pluralism of values. 
From a sociocultural point of view, posthumanism emerges precisely out of this (‘postmodern’) 
discussion about pluralism, but adds another important component to it. This component is based, 
on the one hand, on technolgical development, and, on the other hand, on factors of environmental 
change. Both developments lead to, what might be called, the emergence of a ‘postanthropocentric’ 
world picture, as represented in the idea that humans are, from now on (but, in retrospect, have 
always been) only one group of actors among many other nonhuman forms of agency. Although this 
has, of course, always been the case, the spreading awareness that humans and ‘their’ environment 
(humans and nonhuman animals, humans and machines, objects, etc.) form units and are 
‘networked’, is relatively new and, if taken seriously, has far-reaching consequences for any current 
and future human self-understanding and thus, of course, for the education of future generations. 
This is not to say that within the theory and philosophy of education the current turn to the 
posthuman and posthumanism is without precedent. There have been previous attempts – mainly 
following the poststructuralist ‘ends of man’ or ‘death of the subject’ debate, on the one hand, and 
Donna Haraway’s ‘cyborg manifesto’, on the other hand – to engage with the new figure of the 
‘posthuman’ (without addressing the full implications of ‘posthumanism’, however). The 
poststructuralist-deconstructive route is maybe best represented in the interventions by Gert Biesta, 
while the cyborg-route was pioneered in Noel Gough’s and John Weaver’s work. However, only now 
are there volumes or collections appearing that provide an overview of the wider implications of 
taking posthumanism seriously within educational theory and practice. The earliest strategic use of 
‘posthumanism’ in relation to educational theory is probably by William Spanos in his The End of 
Education: Toward Posthumanism (1993), whose starting point is the poststructuralist critique of the 
ideology of ‘disinterestedness’ underlying the discourse of humanist education. In a similar vein, Gert 
Biesta, in ‘Pedagogy without Humanism; Foucault and the Subject of Education’ (1998), uses the 
poststructuralist critique of the liberal humanist subject and the ‘ends of man debate’ (cf. Derrida 
1982; and Nancy and Lacoue-Labarthe 1981) to attack the ‘manipulative’ character of humanist 
pedagogy (see also Biesta, 2006). This philosophical trajectory based on a poststructuralist critique of 
power and a deconstruction of the liberal humanist subject is supplemented in the work of a number 
of other education theorists by the social implications of ‘cyborgization’ (as introduced by Donna 
Haraway in the mid-1980s; cf. Haraway 1991). As early as 1995, Noel Gough, in ‘Manifesting Cyborgs 
in Curriculum Enquiry’ (1995) proposes to use the figure of the cyborg and the genre of science 
fiction as a way of opening up new forms of narrativization for science teaching (an approach which 
in later publications he supplements with a turn to actor-network-theory ANT; see Gough 2004). This 
line of argument is also taken up by John Weaver in his Educating the Posthuman: Biosciences, 
Fiction, and Curriculum Studies (2010), which relates its demand for an engagement with 
posthumanism to the challenges posed to human ‘nature’ by biotechnology and the new biosciences. 
In line with the challenge to human exceptionalism and the acknowledgement of nonhuman forms of 
agency there are also more recent attempts to rethink education from other theoretical corners, 
which can arguably be subsumed under posthumanism: new feminist materialism, the already 
mentioned actor-network-theory (cf. Fenwick and Edwards 2010 and 2011) and object-oriented-
ontology (cf. Snaza 2015). 
In a special issue of Gender and Education (2013) on ‘Material feminisms: new directions for 
education’, the editors claim that: 
The radical shifts occurring across the social sciences make this an exciting time for educational 
research. New material feminisms, post-humanism, actor network theory, complexity theory, 
science and technology studies, material culture studies and Deleuzian philosophy name just 
some of the main strands that call us to reappraise what counts as knowledge and to re-
examine the purpose of education. Together these strands shift the focus away from 
individualized acts of cognition and encourage us to view education in terms of change, flows, 
mobilities, multiplicities, assemblages, materialities and processes. (Taylor and Ivinson, 2013: 
665) 
Two other recent publications are worth mentioning here to show the extent to which the discussion 
about posthumanism has entered educational and curriculum theory. In Education out of Bounds: 
Reimagining Cultural Studies for a Posthuman Age (2010), Tyson Lewis and Richard Kahn argue for 
what they call “exopedagogy” – i.e. a pedagogy that goes beyond the “bounds” of 
anthropomorphism and which takes into account the entire “bestiary” of “posthuman (zoomorphic) 
monsters” (10ff). Similarly, and most recently, Posthumanism and Educational Research, edited by 
Nathan Snaza and John Weaver (2015), starts form the premise: “What would a world be that did not 
insist on human superiority or dominance and that did not disavow the human’s ecological 
entanglements?” (3; see also Snaza et al. 2014). 
In the following, I propose to briefly discuss some of the different positions and the stakes and 
implications of a posthumanist education and relate them to a few curricular aspects. I begin with a 
discussion of comments made by Peter Sloterdijk – whose importance for education theory in my 
view has not been sufficiently recognized. I am referring especially to the controversy surrounding his 
so-called ‘Elmau Speech’ which takes at its starting point the current crisis of human “technologies of 
domestication” (Zähmungstechniken). 
 
 
3. Humanism as a technology of domestication (Sloterdijk) 
Peter Sloterdijk’s work in recent years has increasingly relied on the term “anthropotechnics” (cf. 
Sloterdijk 2009). In his ‘Response to Heidegger's “Letter on Humanism”’ (the subtitle to his Elmau 
speech, entitled ‘Rules for the Human Zoo’), Sloterdijk recalls Heidegger’s position with regard to 
metaphysics, which criticizes humanism’s Seinsvergessenheit (forgetting of being) in the face of the 
modern technological threat. Sloterdijk puts forward his own technical or rather media-technological 
definition of humanism, namely as “telecommunication in the medium of print to underwrite 
friendship” (Sloterdijk 1999: 12) and as a “chain letter through the generations” (12), whose 
underlying “communitarian fantasy” of “participation through reading the canon reveals a common 
love of inspiring messages” (13). At the heart of this media technological illusion lies “a cult or club 
fantasy: the dream of the portentous solidarity of those who have been chosen to be allowed to 
read” (13). However, this “reading nation” has been thrown into a deep crisis, one the hand, by the 
process of globalization, and, on the other hand, by the process of digitalization. Sloterdijk describes 
the resulting squeeze in these words: 
If this period seems today to have irredeemably vanished, it is not because people have 
through decadence become unwilling to follow their national literary curriculum. The epoch of 
nationalistic humanism has come to an end because the art of writing love-inspiring letters to 
a nation of friends, however professionally it is practiced, is no longer sufficient to form a 
telecommunicative bond between members of a modern mass society. (14) 
The disintegration of the humanist bond is accompanied by growing fears that humanism actually 
might always have been relying on somewhat negative values for its main motivation, namely on the 
fear of a people governed by natural Verwilderungstendenzen [“a tendency towards the 
bestialization of humanity” (15)]. Basically, humanism understands itself as a melioristic antidote to 
humans’ inherent barbarity: “Anyone who is asking today about the future of humanity and about 
the methods of humanization wants to know if there is any hope of mastering the contemporary 
tendency towards the bestialization of humanity” (15). Humanist education based on reading 
therefore amounts to what Sloterdijk calls Zähmungstechnik [“technology of domestication”], which 
is supposed to immunize humans against the spectre of the “unconstrained homo inhumanus” (15). 
From this rather provocative analysis Sloterdijk draws two conclusions, which, in my view, have 
profound effects on any notion of a posthumanist educational programme. Behind the opposition 
between humanism and posthumanism and their respective fantasies or desires, according to 
Sloterdijk, lies the question of “anthropodicy” – that is “a characterization of man with respect to his 
biological indeterminacy and his moral ambivalence” (16). This results in the view that humanism is 
basically a specific media technological communication model, and that it is precisely the technical 
inadequacy of this model which has provoked the current crisis: “Above all… from now on the 
question of how a person can become a true or real human being becomes unavoidably a media 
question, if we understand by media the means of communion and communication by which human 
beings attain to that which they can and will become” (16). What is at stake in a move towards a 
posthumanist notion of education relies therefore on a return to the “underdetermination” of the 
human – the openness and ambivalence of the human – while the specific pedagogical challenge lies 
in a fundamental change of media technologies. The pedagogical question that arises out of 
Sloterdijk’s analysis is: how does one prepare humans today, in the age of biopolitics, new media, 
digitalization and climate change, for the enormous and planetary challenges that lie ahead? 
Sloterdijk understands the contemporary crisis of European national bourgeois humanism as an 
opportunity for a transhumanist or posthumanist thinking to emerge, where both Heidegger, as well 
as a variety of ‘poststructuralists’, such as Derrida, Lyotard, Foucault, Lacan, etc., are giving birth to 
new posthumanist schools of thought. What distinguishes these emerging posthumanisms from the 
earlier Heideggerian and poststructuralist critiques of humanism is, on the one hand, the reopening 
of the question of technology (i.e. following but also going beyond Heidegger, especially as far as 
their interdisciplinary approaches negotiating between the sciences and the humanities are 
concerned), and, on the other hand, the overcoming of Heideggerian or even Foucauldian 
anthropocentrism that remains inscribed even in the most radical antihumanist critique. If, as a 
member of the human species, one tries to take the notion of postanthropocentrism seriously 
fundamental ontological, ethical and environmental questions necessarily arise – questions that must 
inevitably affect any future-oriented pedagogy. For Sloterdijk, this epochal question can be 
articulated as follows: 
What can tame man, when the role of humanism as the school for humanity has collapsed? 
What can tame men, when their previous attempts at self-taming have led primarily to power 
struggles? What can tame men, when, after all previous experiments to grow the species up, it 
remains unclear what it is to be a grown-up? Or is it simply no longer possible to pose the 
question of the constraint and formation of mankind by theories of civilizing and upbringing? 
(Sloteridjk 1999: 20) 
In answer to the last question, Sloterdijk, conscious of writing in the age of what (following Agamben, 
in his rereading of Foucault) might be called generalized “biopolitics” (cf. Agamben 1998), proposes a 
rethinking of a humanist “Zähmungsgeschichte [history of taming]” as a history of “breeding” (given 
the return to eugenics as a result of biotechnological advances). 
Globalization, digitization and biotechnology as a complex media-technological convergence cause 
an emergence of humans from their previous humanist “self-domestication” towards a post- (or 
maybe trans-) humanist form of “self-cultivation”: 
With the thesis of men as breeders of men, the humanistic horizons have been pried apart, so 
that the humanist can no longer only think, but can move on to questions of taming and 
nurture. The humanist directs himself to the human, and applies to him his taming, training, 
educational tools, convinced, as he is, of the necessary connection between reading, sitting, 
and taming. (Sloterdijk 1999: 22) 
A posthumanist educationalist would thus necessarily start by questioning not only existing humanist 
taming technologies as something that might have to be adapted for ‘our’ time, but would query the 
very idea or necessity of and motivation for “taming” as such. However, if Sloterdijk’s analysis is 
correct, would the very possibility of any pedagogical thinking and pedagogical reason not break 
down altogether? Which minimal consensus about values, what minimalist notion of what it means 
to be human and what thus should constitute an education of the human could still be established or 
presupposed, once the idea of “self-cultivation” through educational reproduction is abandoned? Is 
the phrase ‘posthumanist education’, in this sense, not a contradiction in terms? 
The current “intellectual discomfort in the human zoo” (Sloterijk 1999: 25) – the (theme) park-like 
conditions that Sloterdijk refers to as the anthropotechnological “spheres” that humans have been 
creating around themselves to allow for their “hominization” – demands a posthumanist thinking in 
the face of a “zoo-political task” (25). Interestingly, in his interpretation of the crisis of humanism 
Sloterdijk, almost instinctively, returns to the beginning of European humanist thought – Plato: 
Plato’s dangerous sense for dangerous ideas lies within the blind spot of all high culture 
pedagogues and politicos – in particular, his admission of the actual inequality of people 
before the knowledge that power gives. (25) 
What transpires here is that Sloterdijk turns out to be not so radical a thinker of a progressive 
posthumanist project for a transformed democratic education, but someone who remains caught up, 
rather like Heidegger, in late humanist frustration. He seems to place himself, somewhat 
nostalgically, in the position of a (reluctant) observer of the current “archiving” of the humanist 
tradition. It is this nostalgic tone which poses a challenge to any critical posthumanism whose aim 
must be a development of a positive educational programme without this kind of ressentiment: 
Everything suggests that archivists have become the successors of the humanists. For the few 
who still peer around in those archives, the realization is dawning that our lives are the 
confused answer to questions which were asked in places we have forgotten. (27) 
A cynic might be tempted to remark that Heidegger’s letter thus has been responded to by Sloterdijk 
in a somewhat melodramatic way and, despite its critical disguise it has simply performed a 
continuation of the humanist trajectory despite invoking its end. The letter, in this sense, has not 
failed to arrive at its destination. However, taking Sloterdijk’s own analysis seriously, one would have 
to write very different letters – on other media platforms, for example, if these still afford letter 
writing. Rhetorical and stylistic consequences necessarily would arise and the very idea of a 
correspondence would be challenged, which constitutes one of the main starting points for a 
critically posthumanist education – namely the move from literacy to what might be called ‘mediacy’. 
 
 
4. Critical posthumanist education 
So can there be a posthumanist education at all? This is where I need to return to the meaning of the 
term ‘critical’ in the phrase ‘critical posthumanism’. One reply to Sloterdijk’s response to Heidegger 
would be performative, as mentioned above. The humanist founding and legitimating gesture of 
writing letters – a gesture on which ‘men’ and ‘republics of letters’ have been relying and to which 
they cannot stop ‘replying’ (which of course includes my own humble response here) – always 
presupposes a certain ideal of literacy at the core of any humanist education. Given the requirement 
of this most important of humanist technological dispositifs – literacy – how, practically, would a 
(critical) posthumanist education look in terms of curriculum (if, indeed, the notion of curriculum can 
escape its posthumanist deconstruction)? If we follow the logic of postanthropocentrism I outlined 
above, a focus on proliferating environmental issues that include ethical, political as well as 
epistemological aspects suggests itself. In the remaining part of this section I would like to briefly 
turn briefly to each of these aspects (ethical, political and epistemological). 
We can assume that the crisis humanist education finds itself in has been caused by changes both to 
the (humanist) system as well as to the (humanist) subject that supports this system and is in turn 
supported by it. In terms of the system, this crisis is prompted by neoliberal globalization and the 
resulting global competition in educational standards. In terms of the subject, new media 
technologies have led to a change in the fundamental self-understanding of humans as well as to 
new forms of subject positionings or interprellations (to go back to Louis Althusser’s term). How 
would a critical posthumanist pedagogy support, as well as provide possibilities for critique for, these 
emerging new subjectivities and thus enable them to critically and creatively address their new 
systemic environments. This requires, in my view, an ethical-ecological, a political-technological and 
epistemological-cognitive conceptualization together with their appropriate learning contents. To 
recapitulate, this move is based on the understanding of the ‘post-’ in ‘posthumanism’ not as a 
displacement, an overcoming or a detachment from the humanist tradition, but as a critical 
reappropriation, perlaboration and rewriting. 
In the biotechnological age and the time of biopolitics, a posthumanist and postanthropocentric 
ethics must, by definition, be ‘organic’, in the sense of concerned with life and its affirmation and 
survival. It is therefore, on the one hand, characterized by the awareness of human-induced climate 
change and its global impact on the geosphere, biodiversity, resource extraction and the associated 
problems of sustainability (cf. the emerging geological debate around the ‘Anthropocene’). This 
aspect is so central – a question of survival, not only for the human species, but for the entire life-
supporting environment with its non-human actors (animals, plants, machines, objects, etc.) – that 
ecology is becoming the new core educational subject. Instead of being just a new ‘subject’, 
however, ecology is a complex of ideas that needs to inform every teaching practice and curriculum 
in any school or university from the outset. Whether natural sciences, social sciences or humanities, 
at the beginning of any subject-specific training there has to be an engagement with 
postanthropocentric questionings designed to develop an environmental consciousness. For the 
humanities in particular, this means a shift towards teaching the history of hominization from a 
postanthropocentric standpoint that addresses and critically evaluates the idea of human 
exceptionalism and incorporates a focus on environmental entanglement and the importance of 
nonhuman forms of agency. 
One step in this direction would be creating a responsiveness to the work that has emerged out of 
‘(critical) animal studies’, to address and reverse the literal disappearance of animals from human 
and mainly urban environments throughout modernity (with the exception of some selected 
companion species, zoos, nature television programmes and, of course, ever-increasing meat 
consumption). The affective changes that the ‘deanimalization’ (both material as well as 
psychological) and the division of human and nonhuman environments that have occurred 
throughout modernity need to be critically addressed and as far as possible reversed, to create a 
human self-image that recognizes the entanglement of human and nonhuman animality at both a 
material (embodiment) and ethical-ecological level (biodiversity, for example, as an intrinsic good). 
As long as animals are primarily seen and dealt with as goods and industrial products, the process of 
human ‘denaturation’ cannot even begin to be taught appropriately. The phantasm of a complete 
separation between spirit and matter, as promised by transhumanists for example (who merely 
continue in the tradition of two millennia of Christianity and dualist metaphysics), will have to be 
detracted and its cruelty and exclusionary character exposed as a part of a long history of the 
displacement of physicality and the devastating effects this has had on our fellow animals as well as 
on our human self-image. An ecological-ethical education therefore has to critically respond to the 
positive and negative aspects of posthumanization, especially with regard to issues of sustainability, 
redistribution and an idea of social justice, in which the interest of humans may not be considered as 
a priori central. As an example, let me refer at this point to the extremely valuable work by Helena 
Pedersen that engages with educational theory and ‘animals in the classroom’ (Pedersen 2010a). 
The presence of nonhuman animals in education, according to Pedersen, “makes visible the coercive 
and exclusionary implications” of current education policy, and “requires education to seriously 
scrutinize its own embeddedness in reproductive practices and thought patterns and take effective 
measures toward its transformation” (Pedersen 2010b: 693). The benefit of engaging with 
posthumanist theory, for Pedersen, lies in the fact that it “complicates many assumptions 
surrounding the relations between education and democracy and provides new perspectives on the 
notion of ‘voice’ in a context where individual and collective voices of disadvantaged or subordinate 
groups (human or animal) are marginalized or silenced” (687). In this context, the decisive challenge 
that posthumanism poses is: “What would it mean for democracy education to respond to the 
‘voices’ and lived experiences of nonhuman animals?” (ibid.). Posthumanist approaches to animals in 
education, on the other hand, “address the implications for formal education if approached as a web 
of socio-material relations where humans, animals, scientific knowledge, technologies, and artifacts 
interact under shared conditions in a biosocial space” (Pedersen, n.d.). Practically, this means for a 
truly posthumanist education that the constitutive speciesism at work in existing pedagogy does not 
only have to be addressed as such but would need to be actively undone, deconstructed, in order to 
jam so to speak what Giorgio Agamben (1998) refers to as “the anthropological machine” and 
humanist education’s implication within the (re)production of human self-understanding based on 
exceptionalism (cf. also Pedersen 2010c). 
Following this ecological trajectory of postanthropocentrism the question of the distribution of and 
access to resources – material, biological, as well as cognitive and media technological – becomes 
central. This entails the second aspect, namely the political-technological dimension of any 
posthumanist pedagogy worthy of its name. For our current situation, this means a reorientation not 
only as far as the accessibility of the latest technologies are concerned (for the purpose of 
communication, commerce, mobility, health, leisure, etc.), but it requires a second ‘ecological’ shift 
towards postanthropocentrism and its new understanding of humans and nonhumans in relation to 
an emerging global media technological environment. The most advanced approach in this respect, 
in my view, can be found in Bernard Stiegler’s work (2009 ff.), in which he propagates an “originary 
technicity” of the human (not unsimilar to Sloterdijk’s “anthropotechnics”), which insists on the co-
evolution of humans and technology. 
The question of technology – as it was so influentially formulated by Heidegger – today returns with 
a vengeance and with increased urgency (i.e. in the context of global biopolitics). It returns as the 
question of human self-understanding as such (or the Heideggerian Seinsvergessenheit), in the face 
of human disappearance and ambient extinction threats. So, while all human being is “technical” 
(Stiegler) – the technical supplement or prosthesis is what made us human in the first place, and 
today, in a “fourth age of technology” promises to make us posthuman – the “essence” of technology 
is still nothing technical but remains “poietic” (i.e. transformative, creative, “challenging forth”). It is 
important, however, when speaking of technology, technicity or the technical not to forget their 
processes of mediation. It is relatively plausible to see how early techniques developed in the Stone 
Age may have started a hominizing process. The techniques that have been developed since then 
through trial and error and steady perfecting, however, beyond their simple instrumental character 
have an ontological and medial side effect: ontological, in terms of developing a specific human self-
understanding (e.g. in the sense of a modern homo faber) and medial, in that they allow the 
development of media of communication. Marshall McLuhan (1994) referred to this media-
technological understanding of technicity as “extensions of man”. However, as indicated above, even 
though technicity and mediality might overlap, they are not quite identical. During the course of 
modernity the relationship between technicity and mediality, for example, flips. The development of 
technics and technology is basically congruent with the development of modernity – namely with 
industrialization, rationalization and globalization. Three aspects that play a special role in this 
process, however, are language, culture and embodiment, which thus render an identification of this 
process with technicity problematic and instead are better understood as changes in mediality. 
This is even more relevant since, for Stiegler (following Heidegger), “every technical object is 
pharmacological: it is both poison and remedy at the same time” (Stiegler, 2013: 421). A 
“pharmacology” (for example of what Stiegler refers to as “épistémè numérique [the episteme of the 
digital]”) thus involves a critical analysis of the socio-political use of technologies in view of their 
fundamental ambiguity (as remedy, poison, scapegoat, and, as I would add, as media). The digital, for 
Stiegler, is precisely such a challenge which concerns “la vie de l’esprit” [the life of the mind], which 
is essentially based on “exteriorization”, that is to say, based on “the conditions of its expression, 
which are also those of its impressions” (Stiegler, 2014: 14): “we claim that digital evolution of 
technical exteriority and the processes of interiorization that it produces in return constitute a new 
age of the mind, a new mind that would be made possible by this new form of writing that we 
believe the digital to be, and which forces us to rethink the mind itself in its totality” (14; my 
translation). This digital revolution and the constitution of a “knowledge society”, according to Julien 
Gautier and Guillaume Vergne, “with their promises and above all, for the moment, with their 
dangers, put the educational system into a new central and at the same time problematic situation”: 
In particular, the new technologies whose development oscillates between stultifying mass 
industry and unprecedented democratization of access to knowledge, seem to spell the end of 
a school whose aims seem to have become obsolete and whose methods are deemed archaic. 
However, does a solid formation of judgment and of culture not appear so much more 
primordial since we have entered an age that leaves us more and more to our own devices, 
with our minds weighed down by a constant flow of information and incessant solicitations. 
(Gautier and Vergne, in Kambouchner, Meirieu and Stiegler 2012: 13-14; my translation) 
The question of what teaching might mean in the digital age, for Stiegler, is the question of 
education’s “pharmacological” desire to “prendre soin [take care]” of the mind, to control and form 
the mind’s capacity for attention and taste. This means that it is essential to address the “toxic” 
effects of digital technologies and to place them within the service of a “knowledge society” and to 
exploit their potential of new forms of “transindividuation” for positive political ends (Gautier and 
Vergne 2012: 17). 
It follows, that the third aspect of a posthumanist pedagogy aims at the development of a new 
aesthetic. This includes the above-mentioned ethical-ecological and political-technological aspects. It 
arises out of a sense of the changing forms of mediality and new methodological issues raised by 
them. As indicated, Sloterdijk’s insistence on the centrality of changing media, through digitalization 
and globalization, from a literary to a posthumanist, i.e. post literary, value system, does not 
necessarily entail nostalgia or loss, but may as well constitute a chance or even a necessity. This is, 
for example, Michel Serres’ claim in Petite Poucette (2012). In this short educational treatise 
addressed to “Thumbelina” – the name he gives to the generation growing up with keyboards, 
screens and mobile media – Serres states that: 
Without us noticing a new human was born within the brief interval that separates us from the 
1970s. He or she does no longer have the same body, the same life span, no longer 
communicates in the same way, no longer perceives the world in the same way, no longer lives 
in the same nature, no longer inhabits the same space… . Since they no longer have the same 
head as their parents, he or she knows otherwise. (Serres 2012: 13; my translation) 
For Serres, the move away from the “format-page” (the format of the page but also the formatting 
page – of which screens are the latest but also possibly the last remainder) opens up the possibility of 
new forms of intelligence, based on invention, which, for Serres is measured by its opposition to and 
distance from knowledge per se. 
In the same measure as the global media system converges on new media, a new from of media 
‘literacy’ thus becomes a central educational demand, both for the purposes of the system itself, as 
well as for its critical observation and thus for a creative intervention within this system. Mostly this 
skill-set is still referred to as ‘literacy’, or as ‘new literacies’ and ‘multiliteracies’ (Buckingham 2003; 
Cope & Kalantzis 2000). The demand for new ‘literacies’ for new media-technological environments, 
with their new forms of sociality, cooperation and participation, whether to improve the use of 
stationary media (e.g. computer terminals), or the rapidly increasing number of mobile media (smart 
phones, tablets, etc.), are usually related to the current trend towards media convergence, i.e. the 
transition from mass to open and p2p media. Henri Jenkins, one of the pioneers of media 
convergence, was asked to translate the challenges of this new participatory media culture into a 
media education for the 21st century. Jenkins’s intervention was designed to lead to a reorientation 
within the debate between traditionalists and skeptics about how a future-proof media education 
would have to proceed. The goal, as Jenkins writes, was to “shift the focus of the digital-divide 
discourse from questions of technological access to those of opportunities for participation and the 
development of cultural competencies and social skills needed for full involvement” (2009: xiii). To 
this end, Jenkins focused on: 
new media literacies: a set of cultural competencies and social skills that young people need in 
the new media landscape. Participatory culture shifts the focus of literacy from individual 
expression to community involvement. The new literacies almost all involve social skills 
developed through collaboration and networking. These skills build on the foundation of 
traditional literacy and research, technical, and critical-analysis skills learned in the classroom. 
(xiii). 
So what at first glance looks like a radical change in Jenkins’s approach, is nevertheless largely taken 
back at the end of the passage and relinked to traditional ‘literacies’ developed through humanist 
educational practice. Even the pioneer of virtual reality and of the notion of virtual communities, 
Howard Rheingold, in his recent book on the subject, Net Smart (2012), bases his argument on an 
expansion of current literacies and advocates their “supplementation” by skills that optimize the 
usage of the internet: “attention, participation, collaboration, the critical consumption of information 
(aka, ‘crap detection’), and network smarts” (Rheingold 2012: 5). 
Thus, whether we are dealing with arguments for developing new forms of literacy (e.g. 
‘ludoliteracy’) or for integrating new participatory forms of media skills into the educational 
programme (see e.g. ‘peeragogy’), they all have one thing in common: they present themselves in 
terms of continuity with the idea of the literate. In my view, all these varieties of new literacy remain 
caught up in the dynamic of domestication, maybe no longer so much of humans (i.e. in the way 
Sloterdijk ascribes domestication to humanism) but to attempts at taming the potential for change in 
digital and new social media. They could thus all be described as weak defenses in that they stress for 
example that traditional literacy skills are more in demand than ever as people move into the digital 
age, in which we apparently do not read less, but indeed more – even though we have less and less 
time for more and more reading material. Of course, this does not fail to have stylistic, grammatical 
and pragmatic effects on language use, but also on cognition and the attitude towards media more 
generally. These effects are fundamentally aesthetic in nature and concern the linguistic and cultural 
ecology more generally (think for example of the dominance of English in the emerging new social 
media world or the spreading of a global popular culture). 
The positive argument that lies behind the drive towards an adequate integration of digital media 
within current pedagogical theory and practice (cf. Buckingham 2007) is thus merely the reverse side 
of the often quite grotesque attacks on the ‘dumbing down’ potential of new and by implication all 
screen media (a thesis that is well known at least since the advent of commercial television). The 
dumbing down argument usually refers back to the idea of an assault on the reading culture of 
humanism (cf. for example Mark Bauerlein’s The Dumbest Generation: How the Digital Age Stupefies 
Young Americans and Jeopardizes Our Future (2009)). 
In my view the potential benefit of a critical posthumanist education lies entirely elsewhere. If one 
takes the potential for change contained in new media and digitalization seriously (keeping in mind 
the context of globalization in which these new media are taking place), there are indeed high risks 
but also great benefits. And this is where the political task for a posthumanist education lies: taking 
the potential seriously and thinking it through so to speak before any judging and stressing of 
continuities. This is also the way I understand Gautier and Vergne in their preface to Kambouchner, 
Meirieu and Stiegler’s discussion of the ‘digital school’, in L’Ecole, le numérique et la société qui vient 
(2012): 
There is no time any more to ask ourselves whether standards are ‘going down’ or ‘rising’, nor 
whether we need to place the child, the teacher or knowledge at the centre of the system, nor 
whether we should introduce new technologies in school or not. (2012: 12; my translation) 
In the face of the “digital revolution” which leaves the new “pharmacological” exploitation of 
technologies of memory (“hypomnemata”), described by Stiegler, to the economy, a posthumanist 
education would have to reclaim the critical and creative potential contained in new media 
technologies for pedagogical purposes. Some early attempts of this were already made in the 1980s, 
and can be found for example in Gregory Ulmer’s work, which argued for a shift from literacy to 
“electracy” (cf. Ulmer 1989; and Holmvik 2012). 
Katherine Hayles, whose How We Became Posthuman (1999) is usually seen as the beginning of at 
least the critical cybernetic version of posthumanism, in her more recent work deals with the 
cognitive changes and their (amongst other aspects, pedagogical) potential of digitalization. In How 
We Think she starts form the assumption that “we think through, with, and alongside media” (2012: 
1) and shows how this has already affected the current educational programme, especially in the 
humanities. Her starting point corresponds to the posthumanist self-understanding and positioning 
laid out above: “The ability to access and retrieve information on a global scale has a significant 
impact on how one thinks about one’s place in the world” (2). In the intensified interaction between 
human and computer and the new subjectivities and forms of embodiment that arise from it, 
according to Hayles, we are witnessing what she refers to as “extended” and “distributed cognition” 
(3). Consequently, she argues for establishing Comparative Media Studies as a new and central 
subject for schools and universities and which helps investigate the mentioned co-evolution of 
humans, technology and media (or, as Hayles calls it, “technogenesis”). 
Halyles too uses the metaphor of expanding ‘literacies’ to designate new competencies, however, 
she does focus on the cognitive changes that are produced by new forms of reading behaviour. She 
proposes a three-tierd system of reading: traditional (humanist) “close reading”, “hyper reading” and 
“machine reading” (Hayles 2012: 11): 
Hyper reading, which includes skimming, scanning, fragmenting, and juxtaposing texts, is a 
strategic response to an information-intensive environment, aiming to conserve attention by 
quickly identifying relevant information, so that only relatively few portions of a given text are 
actually read. (12) 
This form of reading behaviour if formalized and pedagogically supported correlates with “hyper 
attention, a cognitive mode that has a low threshold for boredom, alternates quickly between 
different information streams, and prefers a high level of stimulation” (12). This is virtually the 
opposite of what is going on in “close reading”. While “hyper attention” is often (mis)interpreted as a 
deficit (if not a pathology, cf. ADHS), it would be preferable for educational purposes to focus on 
hyper reading as a cognitive (and possibly evolutionary) survival technique in the age of “information 
overload”, because “attention as a focus for inquiry opens onto a complex and urgent set of issues, 
including the relation of human to machine cognition and the cycles of epigenetic changes catalyzed 
by our increasing exposure to and engagement with digital media” (Hayles 2012: 12). 
Once again, Bernard Stiegler articulates what is at stake in a more enlightened educational 
engagement with the “postliterate” potential of new digital media and the “new attentional forms” 
they produce (for better or for worse): 
If in fact an appropriate therapeutic response to this pharmacology of attention is conceivable 
and able to be transindividuated, then the question would be to what degree can and even 
must these digital relational technologies also give birth to new attentional forms that pursue 
in a different manner the process of psychic and collective individuation underway since the 
beginning of grammatisation; new forms that make this network society arrive at a new stage 
in the individuation of this plural unity of the logos where the attentional forms we recognize 
as our culture abound? (Stiegler, 2012: 8; see also Stiegler’s latest work on the very ambivalent 
effects of digitalization on the ideas and practices of work in an increasingly “automatic” 
society, cf. Stiegler 2015a and b) 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
This either feared or anxiously awaited neuronal ‘rewiring’ of humans through digital media 
technology is necessarily related to changes within our human self-understanding. A critical 
posthumanism should of course not start from a purely ‘neurocentric’ or cognitive assumption, that 
this change might be fully explained by a correlation of neurological adaption and media-
technological change, but instead should also emphasize the cultural, contextual and aesthetic 
critical aspects of current transformations. The task is to learn to critically and fairly assess the 
potential for change in order to draw the right conclusions for education policy from them. As Hayles 
proposes: 
The trouble, as I see it, lies not in hyper attention and hyper reading as examined but rather in 
the challenges the situation presents for parents and educators to ensure that deep attention 
and close reading continue to be vibrant components of our reading cultures and interact 
synergistically with the kind of web and hyper reading in which our young people are 
increasingly immersed. (2012: 69) 
But what if it is exactly this rational attitude of compromise that is stopping us from seeing and 
understanding the true transformational (i.e. critical-creative) potential of the digital, and what if it 
was exactly this critical-creative potential that was needed to solve the massively complex and 
entangled problems that our future and the future survival of the planet holds? One cannot help 
thinking that it might be our inveterate humanist reflexes themselves that have led us into the 
current situation, and that it could be precisely the concealed, posthumanist, potential of an entirely 
other form of reason, hiding behind the dynamics of new media technology, we will need to cope 
with this entirely new breed and dimension of future crises. Herein lies, in my opinion, the urgency of 
the posthumanist challenge to rethinking education – namely, in developing a new impartiality 
outside anthropocentrism and our humanist reflexes. 
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